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_____________ 
 
No. 12-2711 
_____________ 
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ZAVKIBEG ASHUROV 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-11cr-00533-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
_____________ 
 
Argued: May 16, 2013 
_____________ 
 
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 12, 2013) 
_____________ 
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Robert A. Zauzmer 
Anthony J. Wzorek [ARGUED] 
Office of the United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 
 
Attorney for Appellant United States of America 
 
Leigh M. Skipper 
Brett G. Sweitzer [ARGUED] 
Federal Community Defender Office 
601 Walnut Street, Suite 540 West 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 
 
Attorneys for Appellee Zavkibeg Ashurov 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
 After a jury convicted Zavkibeg Ashurov of presenting 
a materially false statement in an immigration form, the 
District Court entered a judgment of acquittal, concluding that 
the statute of conviction required, but that the Government 
had not proved, that the statement was made under oath.  The 
relevant statute punishes 
 
[w]hoever knowingly makes under oath, or 
. . . under penalty of perjury . . . knowingly 
subscribes as true, any false statement with 
respect to a material fact in any . . . document 
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required by the immigration laws . . . or 
knowingly presents any such . . . document 
which contains any such false statement or 
which fails to contain any reasonable basis in 
law or fact. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (emphasis added).  The United States 
asks that we reinstate Ashurov’s conviction, arguing that the 
“knowingly presents” clause of the statute, which Ashurov 
was charged with violating, does not require that the 
materially false statement be made under oath.  After 
carefully considering the opposing arguments regarding the 
proper construction of this complex law, we conclude that it 
is grievously ambiguous as to whether the “knowingly 
presents” clause requires an affirmation made under oath.  
Accordingly, we apply the rule of lenity and affirm the 
judgment of acquittal.   
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Ashurov, a citizen of Tajikistan, entered the United 
States under a visitor’s visa in 2007 and subsequently sought 
to obtain an F-1 student visa that would permit him to enroll 
in an English language program and temporarily remain in the 
United States.   
 
The application to adjust Ashurov’s status and obtain 
the F-1 visa requires the submission of an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Form I-20, which has been described 
as a “school’s petition to the U.S. Government . . . to sponsor 
a student for enrollment.”  App. 96.  The form requires that a 
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school “designated official”1 provide information regarding 
the candidate and the educational program he or she intends 
to complete, and certify under penalty of perjury that the 
information provided therein is true and that the student will 
be required to pursue a “full course of study” at the school.  
In the context of a language program, “full course of study” 
means at least eighteen hours of classroom instruction per 
week.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(i)(D).  Form I-20 also requires a 
“student certification” whereby students agree to comply with 
the terms and conditions of their admission as students and 
certify that they seek admission “for the purpose of pursuing 
a full course of study.”  That certification is not made under 
penalty of perjury. 
 
Ashurov first sought adjustment of his status in April 
2008 pursuant to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”) Form I-539, which, generally, is used to apply to 
extend or change an individual’s non-immigrant status.  
Included with that form was a Form I-20 wherein Ashurov 
stated that he planned to study English as a Second Language 
at the CMG School in Trevose, Pennsylvania.  The form was 
certified under penalty of perjury by the CMG School’s 
designated official, and was signed by Ashurov without an 
oath, as the form provides.  The application was granted later 
that year and Ashurov obtained a student visa.  In April 2009 
and again in April 2010, Ashurov presented identical Forms 
                                                          
1
  As part of the process to obtain regulatory approval to 
enroll foreign nationals possessing student visas, schools 
must name “designated school officials” who, among other 
things, certify compliance with federal regulations regarding 
enrollment of foreign nationals, and sign the Form I-20.  8 
C.F.R. § 214.3(a)(1)(ii), (l)(1). 
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I-20 to the CMG School officials (all signed by Ashurov, but 
not sworn under oath), who in turn completed them, executed 
them under penalty of perjury, and submitted them to USCIS.   
In 2010, federal authorities began an investigation of the 
CMG School, seizing business records that revealed that the 
school was not providing students the required eighteen hours 
of weekly in-class instruction.  The school was eventually 
closed and its designated school official was indicted.  
Records also revealed that Ashurov’s attendance at the CMG 
School began to decline in 2009 and eventually became 
insufficient to meet the weekly hour requirement.   
 
 Ashurov was originally charged with violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a) by “knowingly making under oath” a 
materially false statement in the Forms I-20, but, given that 
he did not therein certify anything under oath, a superseding 
indictment was returned charging him only with “knowingly 
presenting a false statement.”  18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).  A jury 
convicted him of one count, based on the April 2010 form, 
but the District Court granted him a judgment of acquittal, 
concluding that the oath requirement applied to both the 
“knowingly makes” and “knowingly presents” clauses and 
that, alternatively, it would apply the rule of lenity.  The 
Government now appeals. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
 At issue is the fourth paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1546(a), which punishes: 
 
Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or as 
permitted under penalty of perjury under section 
1746 of title 28, United States Code, knowingly 
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subscribes as true, any false statement with 
respect to a material fact in any application, 
affidavit, or other document required by the 
immigration laws or regulations prescribed 
thereunder, or knowingly presents any such 
application, affidavit, or other document which 
contains any such false statement or which fails 
to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact. 
(emphasis added).  Specifically, Ashurov was indicted for 
violating the “knowingly presents” portion of the statute.  The 
question in this case is what exactly that clause proscribes.
2
 
 
A.   Textual Canons of Construction 
 
We begin, as always, with the text of the law.  In 
framing the discussion of what the “knowingly presents” 
clause prohibits, the parties agree that the provision as a 
whole lists two crimes: one, which is referred to as the 
“making” clause, punishes “knowingly mak[ing]” under oath 
a materially false statement in an immigration-related 
document; the other, which Ashurov was charged with 
violating and which is referred to as the “presenting” clause, 
punishes “knowingly present[ing]” an immigration-related 
document with a materially false statement.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1546(a).  The sole point of contention is whether the 
“knowingly presents” crime, by virtue of the use of the word 
“such,” also requires that the statement that Ashurov 
                                                          
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3731.  We review de novo an interpretation of a statute of 
conviction.  United States v. Randolph, 364 F.3d 118, 121 (3d 
Cir. 2004).   
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presented be made under oath by incorporating that element 
from the “making” clause.  The Government contends that it 
does not, thereby dismissing the need to prove that Ashurov’s 
Form I-20 statements were made under oath.   
 
We begin with two textual modes of construction: first, 
the plain meaning of the word “such” and the rule of the last 
antecedent; and, second, the rule against surplusage.  As we 
shall see, these two textual approaches pull us in polar-
opposite directions. 
 
1.  Ashurov contends that the words “any such false 
statement” in the “presenting” clause refer to a false statement 
with respect to a material fact that is made under oath.  The 
only way this interpretation can be correct, however, is if we 
read “such” to refer both to the adjective clause (“with respect 
to a material fact”) as well as to the verb and adverb 
(“knowingly makes under oath”) of the “making” clause.  
But, grammatically, the words “under oath” in the “making” 
clause do not describe the false statement.  Instead, they 
characterize and qualify the action itself that the statute 
punishes, “knowingly makes.”  As the District Court 
recognized, “such” means “of the character, quality, or extent 
previously indicated or implied.”  United States v. Ashurov, 
Crim. No. 11-533, 2012 WL 1719778, *2 (E.D.Pa. May 16, 
2012) (quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary); 
see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“such” as “[t]hat or those; having just been mentioned”).  In 
other words, the use of “such” is meant to invoke a 
characteristic, a quality, or an extent, and Ashurov’s 
construction requires us to transform the verbs and adverbs in 
the first clause into adjectives in the second. 
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By contrast, reading the second “such” to reach only 
“with respect to a material fact” and not “makes under oath” 
comports with a commonly recognized rule in American 
jurisprudence that “[t]he word ‘such’ . . . naturally, by 
grammatical usage, refers to the last precedent.”  Bahre v. 
Hogbloom, 295 A.2d 547, 552 (Conn. 1972); State ex rel. 
King v. Bd. of Trs. of Firemen’s Pension Fund of Kansas 
City, 184 S.W. 929, 932 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (identifying 
“such” as a “term of comparison” meaning “of the same kind 
as that which has been enumerated”).  Our Court has also 
recognized the basic canon that “referential and qualifying 
words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer 
solely to the last antecedent.”  Tippins v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 
87, 93 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Norman J. Singer, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 47.33 (4th ed. 1985)).  Here, the 
oath requirement is not the last thing mentioned in connection 
with “false statements.”  The last mentioned qualifier is that 
they must be made “with respect to a material fact.”  18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a). 
 
On the other hand, we would be remiss if we did not 
recall that “this rule of the last antecedent is not an absolute 
and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning.”  
J.C. Penney Life Ins. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see 
also Tippins, 73 F.3d at 93 (explaining that the last antecedent 
rule applies only “where no contrary intention appears”).  
Accordingly, although the last antecedent canon favors the 
Government’s reading, we must at the very least satisfy 
ourselves that no “other indicia of meaning” suggests a 
contrary outcome.  See Pilosi, 393 F.3d at 365.  Cf.  United 
States v. Krstic, 558 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(specifically refusing to apply the rule of last antecedent to 
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the use of “such” in the first paragraph of § 1546(a) because 
“there are several candidates for the ‘last precedent’”).    
  
2.  As it turns out, another important canon of 
construction does suggest a contrary outcome: the rule against 
surplusage.  Ashurov contends that reading the “presenting” 
clause as not to include an oath requirement renders the oath 
requirement in the “making” clause superfluous because if a 
defendant makes a materially false statement that is not sworn 
under oath and then presents it, he will be punished even 
absent the oath.  Under such circumstances, the oath 
requirement of the “making” clause would not have any effect 
or use.  We agree.  This very case illustrates how the 
Government may avoid the oath requirement.  Ashurov was 
first indicted for “making under oath a false statement” in an 
immigration document but was subsequently re-indicted only 
for “presenting a false statement” without the oath 
requirement when it became apparent that his portion of Form 
I-20 was not sworn to under oath.   
 
Thus, the oath requirement will be superfluous in all 
cases with a realistic chance of prosecution.  As the 
Government admits, the “maker” of a statement in an 
immigration document is “usually” also the person who 
presents it to the authorities, Gov’t Br. at 17, or at the very 
least is also the person who, like Ashurov, “presents” it to a 
third party who then presents it to authorities.  Accordingly, 
the Government’s response that the oath requirement of the 
“making” clause retains significance “for a maker who does 
not present the statement,” Gov’t Reply Br. at 5, is not well 
taken.  It is hard to imagine that the “making” clause was 
aimed at individuals who swear to a statement under oath in a 
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document he or she leaves lying around that then somehow 
reaches the authorities.   
 
Ashurov’s reading, by contrast, brings symmetry to the 
statute.  It punishes both those who make false statements 
under oath and those, such as professional preparers, who 
submit them, while not punishing the maker of an unsworn 
statement any more than it would punish its presenter.  To 
treat the maker and the presenter the same when the statement 
is made under oath, but differently (and the presenter more 
harshly) when the maker does not swear an oath seems to us 
an anomaly, particularly given that, as the Government 
candidly admits, “[t]he law does not generally punish people 
for lying unless they expressly acknowledge a legal duty not 
to do so.”  Gov’t Br. at 17. 
   
Thus, the “fundamental canon” that we must, if 
possible, give effect to every clause and word of a statute, see 
United States v. Kouevi, 698 F.3d 126, 134 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)), points 
in the opposite direction than the “last antecedent” canon, 
rendering the statute’s text ambiguous. 
 
B.   Other Canons of Construction 
  
Having found the plain text of paragraph four of 
§ 1546(a) ambiguous, we turn to § 1546(a)’s structure, 
history, and purpose in aid of our search for the statute’s 
meaning. 
 
 1. The Structure of § 1546(a) 
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The Government makes two arguments based on the 
statute’s structure.  First, it contends that reading the 
“presenting clause” to not incorporate the oath requirement is 
“logical” because the other three paragraphs of § 1546(a) 
evince a broad desire by Congress to punish all immigration-
related offenses, and none requires an oath.  Gov’t Br. at 15.  
As the Government notes, the other paragraphs of § 1546(a) 
proscribe forging immigration documents (paragraph 1), 
possessing materials used to forge immigration documents 
(paragraph 2), and impersonating another when applying for 
immigration benefits (paragraph 3).  But we reject this 
strained argument because it is hard to see how one could 
even impose an oath requirement on the crimes listed in those 
three paragraphs, given that most do not even involve 
statements.  Moreover, the “making” clause of paragraph four 
does contain an oath requirement, despite its absence from the 
other three paragraphs.  Thus, the lack of an oath requirement 
in the other paragraphs is irrelevant. 
 
Second, the Government points to paragraph one of 
§ 1546(a), which punishes, in relevant part, 
 
[w]hoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters 
or falsely makes any [immigration document] 
. . . or receives any such [document] . . . 
knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, 
or falsely made. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (paragraph one).  The Government notes 
that this paragraph, like paragraph four, prohibits two acts 
separated by “or,” and “repeats the acts listed in the first 
clause . . . in the second clause . . . when it requires that the 
action with the immigration document be done ‘knowing it to 
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be forged, counterfeited, altered or falsely made.’”  Gov’t Br. 
at 19.  Thus, the Government argues, because Congress 
reiterated the description in the second clause of paragraph 
one when it wanted it incorporated there, the description 
“makes under oath” in the “making” clause of paragraph four 
cannot be incorporated into the “presenting” clause because it 
was not reiterated there. 
 
 This argument sweeps far too broadly.  The 
“presenting” clause of paragraph four already incorporates a 
non-reiterated description, “with respect to a material fact,” 
by the use of the word “such,” as the Government concedes.  
If reiteration were always required, this would not be the 
case.  A statute should not be construed “upon the speculation 
that if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader 
words would have been used.”  McBoyle v. United States, 283 
U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.).  
 
2. The Legislative Amendments to the Fourth 
Paragraph of § 1546(a) 
 
Unaided by the statute’s structure, the Government 
makes an appeal to its legislative history.  More precisely, the 
Government resorts to past versions of the statute, as “there is 
no pertinent legislative commentary on any of the 
amendments” to § 1546(a).  Gov’t Br. at 20.  But none cures 
the textual ambiguity. 
 
The strongest support from the statute’s amendment 
history that the Government brings to our attention is the fact 
that in 1996 Congress added the “fails to contain any 
reasonable basis in law or fact” language to the “presenting” 
clause.  See Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C, Title II, § 214, 110 Stat. 
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3009-569 (1996).  There is some force to the Government’s 
argument that it would be illogical to make it a crime to 
knowingly present an immigration document that “fails to 
contain any reasonable basis in law or fact,” id., regardless of 
whether the document was completed under oath, while only 
criminalizing presenting an immigration document containing 
a sworn false statement.  On the other hand, as Ashurov 
notes, it is conceivable that “some representations in 
immigration documents may be so blatantly false . . . that the 
normal oath requirement is excused.”  Ashurov Br. at 31.  
More generally, it is hard to surmise the intent of the 1948 
Congress based on the pronouncement made by Congress 
almost fifty years later.  While the 1996 amendment may 
support the Government, it does not cast enough light on the 
meaning of the statute to resolve the ambiguity created by the 
juxtaposition of the canon of the last antecedent modifier and 
the rule against surplusage.
3
   
                                                          
3
  The remainder of the Government’s arguments 
regarding the legislative amendments to § 1546(a) rest on 
similar speculation regarding what subsequent Congresses 
thought of the 1948 statute and are therefore unpersuasive.  
We refuse to read any meaning into the fact that in 1952 the 
statute was amended to include for the first time the “with 
respect to a material fact” and the “any such false statement” 
language.  See Gov’t Br. at 20-21.  That those provisions 
were added simultaneously does not mean that “any such 
false statement” refers only to “with respect to a material 
fact” as the Government would have us conclude.  As the 
Government concedes, the 1952 amendment also included for 
the first time the words “any such document,” unaccompanied 
by a parallel addition to the descriptors of “document,” 
making it clear that “any such document” was meant to refer 
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3. The Statute’s Purpose 
 
The Government’s next argument is based on the 
statute’s apparent purpose (although it is not clear from where 
this purpose is derived), arguing that “those who affirmatively 
present documents to the immigration authorities . . . knowing 
that those documents contain materially false statements are 
far more likely to have fraudulent intent” than those who 
simply make false statements not under oath.  Gov’t Br. at 17-
18.  But this conclusion is not as intuitive to us.  One might 
just as easily argue that “makers” of false statements are more 
culpable than “presenters” who simply transmit documents.  
The most that can be said for this policy-based argument is 
that it can be fairly interpreted to support both readings of the 
law. 
 
4. The Second Circuit’s Decision in United 
States v. Khalje 
 
Finally, the Government urges us to adopt the 
reasoning of the one precedential case that has addressed the 
question presented here, where the Second Circuit accepted 
the Government’s reading of § 1546(a), reasoning that it: 
 
                                                                                                                                  
to language already in the statute at the time of the 1952 
amendment.  Nor does the fact that the legislative history of 
the 1996 amendment fails to mention that the presenting 
clause contains an oath requirement support the 
Government’s reading.  We will not divine clues from 
legislative silence regarding an already-existing statute. 
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carries out the apparent Congressional purpose 
of penalizing both those who swear to 
materially false statements in visa applications 
and those who present materially false 
statements in such applications, whether or not 
the latter swear to such statements. 
United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam).  But, as the District Court surmised, this analysis 
“makes no effort to explain, based on the statutory language, 
why it finds one antecedent is applicable to ‘any such false 
statement’ but excludes the other,” Ashurov, 2012 WL 
1719778, *3, and does not otherwise attempt to tackle any of 
the difficult interpretative hurdles we have in painstaking 
detail addressed here.  Thus, we decline to follow the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Kahlje.  
 
C.   Rule of Lenity 
 
We conclude that having considered textual, 
contextual, and atextual canons of statutory construction, 
there “remains a grievous ambiguity” as to the meaning of the 
fourth paragraph of § 1546(a).  See Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. 
Ct. 2499, 2508 (2010).  The text of the statute itself points in 
two divergent directions and neither the statute’s structure nor 
its scarce legislative history convincingly resolve the 
dichotomy.  It is thus proper to invoke the rule of lenity in the 
defendant’s favor.  See id. 
 
We recognize and reiterate that the “rule of lenity 
requires more than a difficult interpretative question.”  United 
States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 270 (3d Cir. 2010).  On the 
other hand, the idea embodied by the rule is that “the citizen 
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is entitled to fair notice of what sort of conduct may give rise 
to punishment.”  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 375 
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In this case, Congress has 
written a needlessly convoluted statute—a run-on sentence 
that is but one of four paragraphs contained in a single 
subclause of § 1546.  The sentence consists of 76 words and 
seven uses of the conjunction “or,” and has a complicated 
history of amendments accompanied by nary an 
explanation—and carries stiff penalties at that (up to 10 years 
for run-of-the mill violations but as much as 25 years for 
some).  We have labored through the meandering words of 
this law and carefully considered the well-presented 
arguments of both sides, and are still left with grievous doubt 
as to the statute’s meaning.  The statute thus falls well short 
of providing the required fair notice as to what it punishes.  
Accordingly, we apply the rule of lenity and decline to relax 
the “knowingly presents” crime of § 1546(a) by removing 
from it the oath requirement that appears in the “knowingly 
makes” crime.  “If Congress desires to go further, it must 
speak more clearly than it has.”  Id. at 360 (Majority Op.).  In 
the alternative, the Government is free to amend Form I-20 to 
require an oath from the applicants who complete it. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s 
judgment is affirmed. 
